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Alcor Issue 08

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Alcor
 · 28 Dec 2019

  

H. KEITH HENSON
1794 Cardel Way
San Jose, CA 95124
(408) 978-7616

THOMAS K. DONALDSON
1410 Norman Dr.
Sunnyvale, CA 94087
(408) 732-4234

ROGER E. GREGORY
2040 Columbia St.
Palo Alto, CA 94306
(415) 493-7582

U. S. DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. )
DONALDSON, and ROGER E. GREGORY, )
on behalf of themselves and as )
representatives of others ) COMPLAINT FOR
similarly affected, ) DECLARATORY
) JUDGEMENT
Plaintiffs, )
)
vs. ) No.
)
)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ) ENFORCEMENT OF
RON HELLER, U. S. ATTORNEY OFFICE ) PROVISIONS OF THE
Los Angeles, MICHAEL EMICK, and ) ELECTRONIC
DOES 1 TO 100, inclusive, ) COMMUNICATION
) PRIVACY ACT.
)
Defendants. ) CLASS ACTION
)

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

1. On or about January 12, 1988 law enforcement officials

of Riverside County obtained plaintiffs' electronic

communications (electronic mail, email). From that date to

present plaintiffs have been prevented authorized access to

their electronic communications. Plaintiff Henson contacted

the FBI by phone in March 1988 and requested the FBI to

investigate this apparent violation of Federal law (Title 18,

Section 2701 et seq.) in a letter to Supervisor of Riverside


COMPLAINT 1








FBI Office Ron Heller April 5, 1988. (Attachment A). Request

was referred by the FBI without field investigation to the

U. S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles. This office, following

the disinclination of the FBI to investigate, professed

disinterest. Plaintiff Henson was informed of "declined to

prosecute" decision of U. S. Attorney's office via telephone by

Mr. Heller. With advice from the other plaintiffs, Henson

responded to Mr. Heller (Attachment B) and also wrote Michael

Emick, Chief of Criminal Complaints, U. S. Attorney's Office,

Los Angeles, California on April 25. (Attachment C).

In a subsequent telephone call, Mr. Emick's assistant Mr.

Medrano promised a letter would be sent to Plaintiff Henson

supporting claim by U.S. Attorney's office that provisions of

the Electronic Communication Privacy Act were not violated, or

providing other reason(s) for declining prosecution. In spite

of attempts through Representative Norman M. Mineta and Senator

Pete Wilson (Attachments D, E, & F), and follow-up phone calls,

no substantive response to plaintiff's complaint re the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 has been received

to the date of filing, from an FBI or Justice Department

representative (Attachments G, H, & I).

JURISDICTION

2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant

to U.S.C. 28, Sections 2201, 1331, and 1346.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiffs H. KEITH HENSON, THOMAS K. DONALDSON and

ROGER E. GREGORY are citizens of the United States, residents

of Santa Clara County, and were current users of electronic


COMPLAINT 2








mail service provided by Alcor Life Extension Foundation on

January 12, 1988.

4. Named defendants are agencies and employees of the

Government of the United States.

CLASS ACTIONS ALLEGATIONS

5. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action

pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure on behalf of themselves and the other users of

electronic mail who had their correspondence stored in this

computer. There are between 50 and 100 people in this class.

Some of them are not California residents, and at least one of

them is a citizen of another country. All are entitled to

protection under the provisions of the Electronic Communication

Privacy Act. A comprehensive list of the members of this class

cannot be obtained until the computer in which the list resides

has been returned.

An additional class is all users of electronic mail

in the United States who are entitled to privacy and Fourth

Amendment protection via the enforcement of the provisions of

this Act. This last class is so numerous as to make the

joinder of all members of the class completely impracticable.

However, due to the unique nature of the class, notification

of, and email replies from, a substantial fraction of this

class could be accomplished economically by posting notice

on the computer networks. Eleven thousand people are reported

to read the Usenet news group "misc.legal." Plaintiffs will

offer the widespread members of this class an opportunity to

join the action if instructed to do so by the Court.


COMPLAINT 3








FACTS

6. On or about January 12, 1988 certain law enforcement

agents (coroner's deputies) obtained and executed a warrant to

remove computers and related equipment from Alcor Life

Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., Riverside, CA 92503.

(Attachment J)

7. One of these computers and a small number of

removable disks contained plaintiffs' electronic communications

as they are defined in the Electronic Communication Privacy

Act.

8. Law enforcement agencies in Riverside have prevented

authorized access to plaintiffs' electronic mail. An unknown

number of law enforcement personnel from the Coroner's Office,

the District Attorney's Office, and the Riverside City Police

have obtained plaintiffs' electronic communications in

electronic storage, and have prevented authorized access to

these communications, without Court orders or warrants which

would exempt them from the punitive provisions of Title 18,

Section 2701(b).

9. The warrant used to remove the computer and prevent

authorized access to Plaintiff's electronic mail did not meet

the provisions of Title 18, Section 2703. In particular, no

warrants were issued which provide for the disclosure or

sequestering of plaintiffs' (or any other) electronic mail.

10. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice

Department have refused to either investigate or provide an

explanation for why the provisions of the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act do not apply. Oral communications


COMPLAINT 4








with these agencies have produced the verbal argument that a

search warrant issued against a computer used for electronic

mail is equivalent to a search warrant issued against a post

office, where all mail within the walls of a post office could

be opened and read. Plaintiffs' counter arguments that such a

warrant would be similar to a "writ of assistance," and that

the Fourth Amendment requires "particularly describing" were

dismissed as frivolous.

11. Repeated efforts to resolve these issues through

administrative channels have failed. This matter has been

brought to the attention of this Court only after numerous

attempts have been made to obtain a substantive reply as to why

clear provisions of the law were deemed not applicable by the

FBI and Justice Department.

DISCUSSION

12. A substantial part of the reason Congress enacted

the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 was to

balance Fourth Amendment protection for users of electronic

mail with the needs of law enforcement agents to access this

rapidly growing new form of communications. The Justice

Department testified at length to avoid the cumbersome

provisions of Court orders needed for telephone taps. Congress

went along with the Justice Department and made the seizing of

electronic mail by law enforcement agents similar in procedure

to that required for seizing first class mail, that is,

dependent on a Rule 41 search warrant, or similar State

warrant. (See quotes of James Knapp, then Deputy Assistant

Attorney General, in Attachment C.)


COMPLAINT 5








Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil

Liberties, and the Administration of Justice makes it clear

that Congress was concerned about law enforcement agencies

abusing the Fourth Amendment rights of people who use

electronic mail. This is evidenced by testimony about the

Electronic Communications Privacy Act by Senator Leahy before

the House Subcommittee on September 26, 1985:

"There is no adequate legal protection against the

unauthorized access of electronic communications system

computers to obtain or alter the communications contained in

those computers.

. . . .

"Our bill . . . will help protect private communications

from interception by an eavesdropper, whether the eavesdropper

is a corporate spy, a police officer without probable cause, or

just a plain snoop."

The House and Senate Subcommittees wrote into the law only

a few exceptions from punishing someone who:

". . . intentionally accesses without authorization a

facility through which electronic communication service is

provided; or intentionally exceeds an authorization to access

that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents

authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while

it is in electronic storage . . . ."

In the case at hand, plaintiffs argue that the coroner's

deputies either had no authorization, or exceeded what they

had. It is certain that they obtained the email of a number of

people, including plaintiffs, uncertain as to their altering


COMPLAINT 6








it, and certain that authorized access to plaintiffs' email has

been prevented for the past 11 months.

Exceptions are provided by the Act in Section 2703 for law

enforcement agencies to access electronic communications in

situations where they obtain a warrant. To quote the relevant

section:

"Requirements for governmental access

(a) Contents of electronic communications in electronic

storage--A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a

provider of electronic communications services of the contents

of an electronic communication that is in electronic storage

for one hundred eighty days or less, only pursuant to a

warrant issued under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or

equivalent State warrant" (emphasis added).

The requirements for such a warrant were spelled out by

James Knapp in his testimony: "The affidavit and judicial

authorization should sufficiently specify the people

involved, . . ." (emphasis added).

The requirement to name "the people involved" places no

burden on the law enforcement agency seeking a warrant. In

situations (such as this one) where the names of the people

with stored electronic communications are not known to the law

enforcement agency prior to executing the search warrant and

examining the computer files, John Does 1-1000 could be named

and an amended warrant filed after the names were extracted

from the computer.

The plaintiffs are not aware of any warrants, even John

Doe warrants, which have been issued against their electronic


COMPLAINT 7








communications; it seems clear that our private electronic

communications were seized and the provider of electronic

communication services (Alcor) was forced to disclose the

contents of private email without a warrant.

Law enforcement agencies, in particular the FBI, have

orally supported two lines of reasoning for legally seizing and

denying access to our electronic communications without a

warrant.

1) The law enforcement agents who seized the computer on

which our electronic communications were stored did not know

that there was contained email--despite the fact that the

agents had to unhook the computer from the phone lines.

2) A warrant against the provider of the electronic

communication service to seize the computer on which our email

was stored is sufficient to seize and examine any electronic

communications stored within that computer.

If this were the case, Congress would have provided an

exemption for seizing the computers on which electronic mail is

stored. Since they did not, such an exemption will have to be

provided by the Courts, or found to be an error in the FBI's

interpretation of the law.

It is easy to understand the reluctance of one law

enforcement agency to investigate another, especially in the

small-town, close working conditions of Riverside. But if the

FBI will not protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens

from over-zealous local officials who violate the privacy of

electronic communications, who will?




COMPLAINT 8








PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs and the classes they seek to

represent in this action respectfully pray that this Court

enter judgment against defendants:

a) That the FBI be ordered by this Court to investigate

fully the circumstances herein described involving electronic

mail sequestered by law enforcement agents in Riverside County;

b) That the U. S. Attorney's office be ordered to either

file charges based on the results of the FBI determination of

the facts involved, or forthwith provide legal argument

acceptable to this Court as to the non-applicability of Title

18, Section 2701 et seq. to this case;

c) Plaintiffs' expenses;

d) Other relief such as the Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: December 9, 1988 H. KEITH HENSON




THOMAS K. DONALDSON






ROGER E. GREGORY
















COMPLAINT 9






(Attachments to Henson, Donaldson, and Gregory lawsuit)



H. Keith Henson

1794 Cardel Way

San Jose, CA 95124

408-978-7616



April 5, 1988



Ron Heller, Supervisor

Federal Bureau of Investigation

P.O. Box 2317

Riverside, CA 92516



Dear Mr. Heller:



Please excuse the delay in getting this material to you per our telephone
conversation of last month. My background is in engineering, and, though I
have had experience in space law and international human rights, it took
some time for me to acquire sufficient understanding of the law in this
area to make a clear statement.



I believe a serious Federal crime has been committed against me and

several others by certain members of the Riverside County Coroner's
Office. The statute involved is Title 18, Section 2701, otherwise
referenced as Chapter 121, "Stored Wire and Electronic Communications
and Transactional Records Access." (1986) The criminal act was the
removing of a computer (specifically a Toshiba T300 with a green screen
monitor, a Xebec 10 Mbyte hard disk and a modem) used for electronic mail
from the Alcor Life Extension Foundation at 12327 Doherty St., in
Riverside on January 12 of this year, subsequently preventing authorized
access, and (probably) accessing stored electronic mail files on that
computer, all without a warrant. I have apprised various members of the
coroner's office of the use and content of this particular computer and of
the Federal law involved. They seem to have no concern about the legality
of their activities.



Subsection (a) of 2701, except as provided in subsection (c), details the
offence: intentionally accessing an electronic mail facility without
authorization, or intentionally exceeding an authorization to access that
facility and thereby obtaining or preventing authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication.



Subsection (c) provides three exceptions for authorized access. Points 1
and 2 under that sub-subsection do not apply, as the coroner's office
neither provides electronic communication service, nor are they the
intended recipient of the electronic mail in question. Point 3 list three
statutes under which law enforcement officials can obtain authorization
to access stored electronic mail. Of these, section 2518 is the standard



Ron Heller Page 2
April 5, 1988



wire tap regulations. As far as I know, the coroner's office has not
obtained a court order which would allow wire tapping or access to my
electronic mail.



Section 2704 provides for forcing service providers to make backups of
electronic mail, (with a warrant) and does not seem applicable either.



Section 2703 provides for only one way for law enforcement agencies to
access electronic mail stored less than 180 days: a warrant issued under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or an equivalent State warrant. I
do not believe that warrants of any kind have been issued which would
permit the coroner or his deputies access to my electronic mail on the
Alcor computer system. If warrants to this effect have been issued, I have
not been informed of them.



While the coroner's office has been engaged in an investigation, this is no
excuse for a law enforcement agency to break laws by failing to obtain a
valid warrant. My reading of the law, and the legislative history behind it,
leads me to believe that this particular episode of Fourth Amendment
abuse is exactly what Congress had in mind to prevent when it passed
Chapter 121.



The loss of this computer and our other computers has cause Alcor a great
deal of difficulty. (This may have been the primary reason they were
taken.) Alcor and its members need the computer in question to be
returned to us and put back in service if this is possible. I would like the
computer and related equipment returned to Alcor rather than the FBI
holding it as evidence. Alcor could make printed copies of the directories
and "userlist" to be preserved as evidence.



Please let me know if I have made errors in either my reasoning or the
events I have described. I will be happy to provide your office with
background on any aspects of this matter about which I have knowledge.



Sincerely,



H. Keith Henson



cc C. Ashworth



PS I hear the investigation has been turned over to the Riverside Police
Department. You might warn them so *they* don't run afoul of Federal
Law.



Enc. Title 18 USC Sections 2701-2710



ATTACHMENT A

--------------------------------------

H. Keith Henson

1794 Cardel Way

San Jose, CA 95124

408-978-7616



April 22, 1988



Ron Heller

Federal Bureau of Investigation

P.O. Box 2317

Riverside, CA 92516



Dear Mr. Heller:



I was astounded at the refusal of the FBI to even make minimal

inquiry into a citizen`s complaint of a clear violation of a

Federal law. Your advice that I take my complaints to Riverside

County is hard to fathom; to the best of my knowledge, the county

has no laws regarding intercepting electronic mail.



Your argument that having an unrelated warrant to take a computer

permits interception of the electronic mail of all people who

were using that computer would (I think) generate great concern

among the staff and members of the House Committee on the Judi-

ciary which held extensive hearing on this law only two years

ago.



Your reluctance to investigate another law enforcement agency is

understandable, but if the federal government won`t protect citi-

zens from local officials who break Federal laws and violate our

Fourth Amendment rights, who will?



Sincerely,



H. Keith Henson



HKH:al



cc: John R. Bolton, Asst. Attorney General

Rep. George Brown

Michael Emick, U. S. Attorney

Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr.

Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier

James Knapp, Asst. Attorney General

Rep. N. Mineta

Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead

Sen. Pete Wilson



ATTACHMENT B



----------------------------------



(KH Letterhead)



April 25, 1988



Michael Emick

Chief of Criminal Complaints

U.S. Attorney's Office

312 N. Spring St.

Los Angeles, CA 90012



Dear Mr. Emick:



This letter is to complain about the refusal of the FBI office in

Riverside to investigate a clear violation of Federal law.



Mr. Heller did not pass on the enclosed letter to Alka Sagar of

your office, and she had no recollection Monday of his verbal

arguments for the FBI's inaction.



I looked into the legislative history of the particular House

Bill which eventually became law and found that James Knapp (who

was then Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

and has since moved to a higher position in the Justice Depart-

ment) had a number of things to say about the impending legisla-

tion. He was particularly interested in forstalling the need for

court orders to obtain access to stored electronic communica-

tions. I quote from his written testimony of March 5, 1986

before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the

Administration of Justice:



"The authorization to intercept the communications should be

accomplished by a statute mandating a judicial authorization

based on probable cause akin to that which can now be secured

with a Fourth Amendment search warrant pursuant to Rule 41 of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is based on

the premise that the interception of electronic mail generally

should be accorded no more protection than that accorded to

regular mail. At the present time regular mail can be seized

with a Rule 41 search warrant. . . .



"The search warrant . . . should be based on a sworn affidavit

establishing probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is

being or is about to be committed. The affidavit and judicial

authorization should sufficiently specify the people involved,

the facility in question, the specific offenses involved, and the

type of information sought to be intercepted. . . ."



Congress went along with the Justice Department in requiring

search warrants rather than the more cumbersome court orders,

with the understanding that they would watch for abuse.





Michael Emick -2- April 25, 1988





Now in the case at hand, there was a search warrant, but it was

clearly inadaquate to seize electronic mail since it was directed

to the computer rather than its contents and the people who put

the contents into it.



The correct analogy according to Mr. Knapp's testimony would be a

search warrant obtained against a private postal service in which

all mail in private boxes was confiscated, opened, and read.



The search warrant under which the computer was taken was based

on incredible half-truth distortions, and simply irrelevent

information. For example, the prime item presented under oath to

the judge who issued the warrant was verbal testimony about a

copy of a receipt for equipment sold to UCLA, shipped to a

Florida address, and authorized by an Alcor officer who works at

UCLA. In the first place, the coroner's office has no business

investigating theft. If they found something suspicious in the

course of other investigation, they should have turned it over to

the police. In the second place, *taped to the front of that

invoice was a canceled check on the officer's account for the

full amount on the invoice.* If this isn't perjury, it skates

within a hair of it.



This may seem to be an unpopular cause to the FBI, but this is

the first time (to my knowledge) that a law enforcement agency

has violated the provisions of this law. As a result, there is a

great deal of interest by a number of people in the electronic

mail industry. If local law enforcement officials demonstrate

that they can get away with ignoring this law, there may be

considerable pressure on Congress to require more stringent

provisions for law enforcement agencies to obtain access to

electronic communications.



If you have any questions, please give me a call.





Sincerely,





H. Keith Henson



HKH:al



cc: Christopher Ashworth, Esq.



ATTACHMENT C



------------------------------



(KH Lettterhead)



April 25, 1988



Representative Norman Mineta

13th District

1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310

San Jose, Ca 95128



Attention: Dorene Giacopini



Dear Representative Mineta:



I am writing to ask you to intercede with the FBI on behalf of

myself and two other San Jose constituents, Thomas K. Donaldson

and Roger Gregory. We believe a Federal Law, Section 2701, et

seq. of Title 18, was broken by local law enforcement officials in

Southern California. We would like you to make a request of the

FBI that they determine if this is true, and if it is, ask the

U.S. Attorney to file charges.



All of us used (and paid for through membership fees) an elec-

tronic mail facility owned by the Alcor Life Extension Founda-

tion. On January 12 of this year, the computer containing our

confidential personal communications was seized by the coroner`s

office in Riverside under a warrant issued against Alcor and

obtained on the basis of gross distortions. Regardless of the

validity of this warrant, <2703 requires a warrant naming the

individual whose mail is to be seized, and stating probable cause

as to the need to invade the individual`s privacy. No warrants

have been issued which would permit these officials to access or

deny us access to our electronic mail.



The FBI is understandably reluctant to investigate a fellow law

enforcement agency. In my first telephone conversation with Ron

Heller he strongly discouraged me from complaining. While it may

have been inadvertent, his office lost my first letter (sent by

Express Mail), did not pass on the enclosed letter to the U.S.

Attorney`s office, and suggested (when he called after 5PM last

Friday) that my only recourse is to the same local officials who

have violated the law.



The cited section of law, the Electronic Communications Privacy

Act of 1986, and the cases which develop from it are of great

interest in Silicon Valley, where the local volume of electronic

mail may be approaching that of First Class mail. There is a

considerable interest expressed by several computer publications

in the case. I can direct the reporters who are calling me to

your office if you wish.



Sincerely,





H. Keith Henson



HKH:al



ATTACHMENT D



---------------------------------



(KH letterhead)



April 25, 1988



Senator Pet Wilson

2040 Ferry Building

San Francisco, CA 94111



Attention: Lisa Nauman



Dear Senator Wilson:



(body same as Attachment D)



ATTACHMENT E



---------------------------------



(KH Letterhead)



July 31, 1988



Representative Norman Mineta

13th District

1245 S. Winchester Blvd., Suite 310

San Jose, Ca 95128



Dear Representative Mineta:



Thank you for pursuing an inquiry for me into the FBI's disinter-

est in an apparent violation of the Electronic Communication Pri-

vacy Act, and for forwarding a copy of Mr. Floyd Clark's letter.



In that letter of June 3, the FBI excused their unwillingness to

investigate because the US Attorney declined prosecution. Alka

Sagar, the US Attorney in Los Angeles who Mr. Heller told me had

made the decision to decline prosecution, based her decision

entirely on a short telephone conversation with FBI represen-

tative Mr. Heller. When I contacted her on the Monday after Mr.

Heller told me that no investigation was going to be made, she

told me that my letter to the FBI had not been forwarded. She

could not remember either the subject or the reason for declining

prosecution. If I could speculate on the conversation, Mr. Heller

may have told her he had a case he did not want to work on, and

her response may have been something like "Well, if you don't

want to work on it, the U.S. Attorney isn't interested." This is

hardly an independent evaluation of the merits of my complaint.



I then wrote to Michael Emick, Ms. Sagar's boss. He is Chief of

Criminal Complaints for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los

Angeles. One of Mr. Emick's assistants called a week or two

later and told me that virtually no cases except those involving

large amounts of cocaine are being accepted for prosecution,

regardless of the merits. I have received no written response to

my letter of April 25 to date (copy enclosed).



There may be a need for remedial legislation on electronic pri-

vacy. Mr. Heller, a San Jose FBI agent, and two representatives

of the District Attorney's office in Riverside all believe that

the requirements for obtaining warrants against individuals found

in 1986 law can be safely ignored if a warrant can be obtained

against the computer on which the electronic mail is stored.

They use the analogy that if they obtained a warrant against a

Post Office, they could open and read any mail they found within

the walls of the Post Office. I doubt this was the intent of



Representative Norman Mineta -2- July 31, 1988



Congress, but if it was, the fact would be of great interest in

this area.



In his closing sentence, Mr. Clark recommends that I contact an

attorney to see what civil remedies are available to me. I have

already contacted several. I find that while there are pro-

visions (Section 2707) for civil actions at law, they are use-

less. If a jury found that my privacy rights had indeed been

violated, I could be awarded $1,000. The attorneys I have

contacted tell me that the case could be made, and likely won,

but the cost to do so would start at $100,000 and range upwards

of $500,000.



If this were an isolated incident, I would feel better about

ignoring the decay of civil rights in this area. But recently

Riverside county officials used a search warrant to confiscate

television news tapes in violation of federal and state laws pro-

tecting freedom of the press. Limits on law enforcement activi-

ties are as important as limits on criminals. Although it is a

lot of trouble for a citizen to oppose high handed law enforce-

ment agents, it has to be done to prevent the loss of our rights.



I would appreciate your inquiring of the Justice Department what

reasoning they used to decline enforcing the law Congress made

regarding electronic communications. Perhaps they would respond

to a letter from you in less than three months. I know you are

sensitive to shortcuts in due process, and I could use your ad-

vice on what, if anything, I should do.



Sincerely,



H. Keith Henson



HKH:al



ATTACHMENT F



-----------------------------------



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Wahsington, DC 20535



June 27, 1988



Honorable Pete Wilson

United States Senator

2040 Ferry Building

San Francisco, California 94111



Dear Senator Wilson:



Your May 18th inquiry of the Department of Justice on behalf

of Mr. H. Keith Henson has been referred to FBI Headquarters.



Mr. Henson's concerns have been reviewed both here and by

our Los Angeles Office. The facts have been presented to the

United States Attorney's Office and prosecution was declined.

Mr. Henson has been advised of the declination and that our

investigation is closed.



It has been suggested to Mr. Henson that he contact an

attorney of his choice to pursue possible civil remedies

available to him.



Sincerely yours,



(signed)



Floyd I. Clarke

Assistant Director

Criminal Investigative Division



ATTACHMENT G



--------------------------------



U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, DC 20530



04 NOV 1988 (stamped date)



Honorable Norman Y. Mineta

U.S. House of Representatives

1245 South Winchester Blvd., Suite 310

San Jose, California 95128



ATTN: Dorene M. Giacopini

Field Representative



Dear Congressman Mineta:



This is in response to your letter dated September 22, 1988,

on behalf of your constituent H. Keith Henson.



The Unites States Attorney's office for the Central District

of California considered twice whether prosecution was warranted,

taking into account the information provided by Mr. Henson.

However, there is no competent evidence upon which to base a

federal prosecution.



Since Mr. Henson's letter addresses a matter courrently

being prosecuted by the State of California, this office

recommends that you refer Mr. Henson's inquiry to the District

Attorney's office, Los Angeles, California.





Sincerely,



(signed)



Thomas M. Boyd

(for) Assistant Attorney General



ATTACHMENT H



------------------------------



(KH Letterhead)



November 9, 1988



Thomas M. Boyd

Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, DC 20530



Dear Mr. Boyd:



Representative Norman Mineta passed on your undated letter to me

responding to his letter of September 22, 1988.



It is a violation of federal law (Title 18, Section 2701 et seq.)

to seize a person's electronic mail without a warrant against the

person's mail. My electronic mail was seized without a warrant

being sought against it. Could you tell me how these simple-to-

determine facts fail to provide "competent evidence on which to

base a federal prosecution." Could you tell me what constitutes

"competent evidence" or provide a reference?



Could you clarify the last paragraph of your letter. To the best

of my knowledge there is nothing related to any letter I have

written which is "currently being prosecuted by the State of

California" by the District Attorney's office in Los Angeles. If

there is, this would be of intense concern.



Sincerely



H. Keith Henson



HKH:al



cc Representative Norman Y. Mineta



ATTACHMENT I



-----------------------------



COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SEARCH WARRANT



(boilerplate, description of place to be searched)



. . . for the following property:



1. All electronic storage devices, capable of storing,

electronic data regarding the above records, including magnetic

tapes, disc (floppy or hard), and the complete hardware necessary

to retrieve electronic data including CPU (Central Processing

Unit), CRT (viewing screen, disc or tape drive(s), printer,

software and service manuals for operation of the said computer,

together with all handwritten notes or printed material

describing the operation of the computers. (See Exhibit A -

Search Warrant No. 1, property to be seized #1)



2 Human body parts identifiable as belonging to the deceased,

Dora Kent.



3 Narcotics, controlled substances and other drugs subject to

regulation by the Drug Enforcement Administration.





(more boilerplate, signiture of Judge)





ATTACHMENT J

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