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AIList Digest Volume 4 Issue 163
AIList Digest Monday, 7 Jul 1986 Volume 4 : Issue 163
Today's Topics:
AI Tools - The Logix System,
Psychology - Psychnet BBoard,
Games - Hitech Results,
Techniques - Hopfield Networks for Traveling Salesman,
Opinion - Common Sense,
Philosophy - Creativity and Analogy
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Date: Thu, 3 Jul 86 17:03:11 -0200
From: Ehud Shapiro <udi%wisdom.bitnet@WISCVM.ARPA>
Subject: The Logix system
We are pleased to announce the availability of the Logix system, an
experimental Flat Concurrent Prolog program development environment.
Logix can be used to study and experiment with concurrent logic
programming, and to develop applications that can benefit from
combining the expressive power of concurrency with that of the logical
variable.
Logix is not a conventional programming environment; although presently
a single user single processor system, its basic design scales to a
multiprocessor, multiuser system. With its novel approach to parallel
computation control, its concept of active modules and its
object-oriented design of system hierarchies, it is an interesting
system to study in its own right. For the same reason it may be
overdeveloped for the casual user in certain respects (e.g. its
multitasking capabilities), and underdeveloped in others (e.g.
interactive help, "friendliness").
Logix includes an FCP compiler to an abstract machine instruction set
and a C emulator of the abstract machine. With the exception of the
emulator and a few kernels, it is written entirely in Flat Concurrent
Prolog. The system was bootstrapped in Summer 1985, and has seen
extensive use and development since. It was used to develop
applications (including Logix itself) whose total size is over 20,000
lines of FCP source code.
Logix is available on Vax and Sun computers, under the Berkeley Unix
and Ultrix operating systems. It is expected that applications
developed under Logix would run almost directly on a multiprocessor
implementation of Flat Concurrnt Prolog; the availability of such a
prototype system for the Intel iPSC hypercube is announced separately.
The handling fee for a non-commercial license to the Logix system
is $250 U.S. To obtain a license form and/or a copy of the Logix user
manual write to:
Mr Yossef Dabby
Department of Computer Science
The Weizmann Institute of Science
Rehovot 76100, Israel
To obtain an electronic copy of the license write to:
CSnet, Bitnet: logix-request@wisdom
ARPAnet: logix-request%wisdom.bitnet@wiscvm.arpa
References
[1] A. Houri and E. Shapiro, "A sequential abstract machine for Flat
Concurrent Prolog", Weizmann Institute Technical Report CS86-20,
1986.
[2] W. Silverman, M. Hirsch, A. Houri, and E. Shapiro, "The Logix system
user manual, Version 1.21", Weizmann Institute Technical Report
CS86-21.
[3] M. Hirsch, W. Silverman, E. Shapiro, "Layers of protection and
control in the Logix system", Weizmann Institute Technical Report
CS86-19, 1986.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 86 12:34:27 CDT
From: Robert C. Morecock <EPSYNET@UHUPVM1>
Reply-to: EPSYNET@UHUPVM1
Subject: Announcement of new bboard named psychnet
[Forwarded from Arpanet-BBoards by Laws@SRI-AI.]
PSYCHNET (tm) Psychology Newsletter and Mailing List EPSYNET@UHUPVM1
The Psychnet mailing list and Newsletter sends out information and
news to those who sign up. Within Bitnet, Psychnet is also a 24-hour
server machine which mails out files to users who first send the
PSYCHNET HELP command to userid UH-INFO at node UHUPVM1. OUTSIDE
BITNET Psychnet is a mailing list and Newsletter only. Once per week
ALL members receive the latest Psychnet Newsletter and Index of files
available on the server machine. Outside Bitnet, if a file looks
interesting send an E-mail request to userid EPSYNET (NOT uh-info) at
node UHUPVM1 and the file will be shipped out to you. Persons within
may also sign up for the mail list and will get the Newsletter and
Index along with other news. Users within Bitnet should get their
files directly from the server machine. An Exec file is available for
CMS users and COM files are available for VAX users within Bitnet.
If you have a file or idea you wish distributed to members of the
list you may send it to userid EPSYNET at node UHUPVM1 and it will be
sent out for you, usually with the week's Psychnet Newsletter. An
initial formal purpose of Psychnet is distribution of academic papers
in advance of this year's (1986) APA convention. Other purposes will
develop according to the needs and interests of the profession and
Psychnet users.
All requests to be added to or deleted from the mailing list, or to
have files distributed should be sent to:
Coordinator: Robert C. Morecock, Psychnet Editor, EPSYNET@UHUPVM1
------------------------------
Date: 6 Jul 86 22:37:15 EDT
From: Murray.Campbell@k.cs.cmu.edu
Subject: Hitech results
[Forwarded from the CMU bboard by Laws@SRI-AI.]
Hitech had a tough day, but set a new milestone for computer chess.
In round 8, Hitech drew International Master Michael Rohde, rated
2602, for what we believe is the first draw by a computer against
a titled player in regular tournament play. In round 9 Hitech
lost to Hungarian Grandmaster Guyla Sax, rated 2769.
Overall Hitech finished with 5.5/9, a respectable score given the
quality of the competition. The performance rating was approximately
2440.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 5 Jul 86 21:53:36 EDT
From: ambar@EDDIE.MIT.EDU (Jean Marie Diaz)
Reply-to: ambar@mit-eddie.UUCP (Jean Marie Diaz)
Subject: Re: connectionism/complexity theory
(an article published in the April 1, 1985 edition of Fortune--posted
w/out permission)
WHAT BELL LABORATORIES IS LEARNING FROM SLUGS
[...] Inspired by the discoveries of physicist John Hopfield, a team
of Bell Labs scientists has been using research on slugs' brains to
develop a radically new type of computer. [...] The Bell computer
does not always select the single [best traveling salesman] route,
but--much like a human--it comes up with one of the better routes, and
never picks anything obviously loony.
New techniques for recording neurological activity in rats and in
three types of slugs--favored because of their large and accessible
nerve cells--are providing Bell's team with reams of information about
how neurons work. But the conceptual focus of the Bell project is the
model of the new neural-network computer created by Hopfield, 51, who
splits his time between Bell Labs and the California Institute of
Technology. Neural networks operate in the analog mode--when
information enters the brain, the neurons start firing and their
values, or "charges," rise and fall like electric voltage in analog
computers. When information is digested, the network settles down
into a so-called steady state, with each of its many neurons resting
close to their highest or lowest values--effectively, then, either on
or off. A computer designed to mimic a neural network would solve
problems speedily by manipulating data in analog fashion. but it
would report its findings when each neuron is either in the on or off
state, operating like a digital computer speaking a binary language.
The simulated computer designed by Hopfield and his AT&T colleagues
uses microprocessors to do the work of neurons. Each microprocessor
is connected to all others--as many neurons are interconnected--which
would make the machine costly and complex to build. Another major
difference between this computer and traditional ones is that memory
is not localized in any one processor or set of processors. Instead,
memory is in the patterns formed by all the neurons, whether on or
off, when they are in steady states. As a result, the computer can
deal with fragmentary or imprecise information. When given a
misspelled name, for example, it can retreive the full name and data
about the person by settling on the closest name in the network.
Though analog computation is astonishingly fast, it sacrifices
precision. Neural-network computers work best on problems that have
more than one reasonable solution. Examples include airline
scheduling, superfast processing for robots or weapons, and, more in
AT&T's line, routing long-distance telephone traffic.
-John Paul Newport
--
AMBAR
"I need something to change your mind...."
------------------------------
Date: 02 July 86 20:18 EDT
From: KVQJ%CORNELLA.BITNET@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU
Subject: common sense
I have been thinking a lot about the notion of common sense and
its possible implementation into expert systems. Here are my ideas;
I would appreciate your thoughts.
Webster's Dictionary defines common sense as a 'practical knowledge'.
I contend that all knowledge both informal and formal comes from
this 'practical knowledge'.
After all, if one thinks about Physics,Logic,or Chemistry,much of it
makes practical sense in the real world. For example,a truck colliding
with a Honda civic will cause more destruction than 2 Hondas colliding
together. I think that people took this practical knowledge of the world
and developed formal principles.
It is common sense which distiguishes man from machine. If a bum on
the street were to tell you that if you give him $5.00 he will make you
a million dollars in a week, you would generally walk away and ignore him.
If the same man were to input it into a so called intelligent machine,the
machine would not know if he was Rockefeller or an indigent.
My point is this, I think it is intrinically impossible to program
common sense because a computer is not a man. A computer cannot
experience what man can;it can not see or make ubiquitous judgements
that man can. We may be able to program common-sense like rules into
it,but this is not tantamount to real world common sense because real
world common sense is drawn from a 'database' that could never be
matched by a simulated one.
Thank you for listening.
sherry marcus kvqj@cornella
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 3 Jul 86 17:07 EST
From: MUKHOP%RCSJJ%gmr.com@CSNET-RELAY.ARPA
Subject: Creativity and Analogy
Jay Weber makes some interesting observations:
> Consider the following view of analogy, consistent with its formal
> treatment in many sources. A particular analogy, e.g. that which
> exists between a battery and a reservoir, is a function that maps
> from one category (set of instances) to another. Equivalently we
> can view this function as a relation R between categories, in this
> case we have a particular kind of "storage capability". This relation
> is certainly
>
> 1) reflexive. "A battery is like a battery" (under any relation)
>
> 2) symmetric. "A battery is like a reservoir" implies
> "A reservoir is like a battery" under the same relation R
>
> 3) transitive. "A battery is like a reservoir" and
> "A reservoir is like a ketchup bottle" imply
> "A battery is like a ketchup bottle" WHEN THE SAME
> ANALOGY HOLDS BETWEEN THEM (same R).
>
> Then any analogy R is an equivalence relation, partitioning the space
> of categories. Each analogy corresponds to a node in an abstraction
> hierarchy which relates all of the sub-categories, SO THE SPACE OF
> ANALOGIES MAPS ONTO THE SPACE OF ABSTRACTIONS, and so under these
> definitions analogy and abstraction are equivalent.
I agree with your reasoning and the conclusion that analogies map ONTO
abstractions--in fact, I think they map ONTO and ONE-TO-ONE (in other words
there is a one-to-one correspondence). Also, EACH analogy (and abstraction)
partitions the space of categories into two subspaces. However, the SPACE
of analogies does not partition the space of categories because the world
can concurrently be modeled by multiple abstraction lattices (not necessarily
hierarchies) in which the transitivity property may not hold. Consider the
following:
a) "A battery is like a reservoir" (storage capability)
AND b) "A reservoir is like a pond" (body of water)
DO NOT IMPLY:
c) "A battery is like a pond"
> ...
> no one could agree to a particular formal definition of the term "analogy",
> since we all have individual formal definitions by virtue of the fact that
> we will answer yes or no when given a potential analogy instance, so we
> are formal language acceptors with our senses as input. This is what I
> mean by a "slippery" term, i.e. one that has drastically different
> meanings depending on its user. This is why I say a formal definition
> of analogy would satisfy very few people.
I am glad that scientists, by and large, have not let "slipperiness" in
some linguistic sense (as you define it) discourage them from carrying on
their research. Of course, all research issues are "slippery" in a conceptual
sense, by definition. (I would also expect a high degree of correlation
between linguistic and conceptual "slipperiness").
There has been some discussion now (in AIList) on the relationship
between "creativity" and "making-interesting-analogies". Is it mere
empirical association or are there stronger causal links? One extreme
view is that the definition of creativity is "making interesting analogies".
Some recent illuminating discussions in this forum suggest that the ability
to synthesize concepts from partial concepts in other domains is a key
ingredient of a great number of creative activities.
Is there some creative task that could not be performed by a machine
capable of making complex analogies in an interesting manner--a complex
analogy being defined as a many-to-one transformation between domains (as
opposed to a simple analogy which is a one-to-one mapping)?
Uttam Mukhopadhyay
Computer Science Dept.
General Motors Research Labs
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End of AIList Digest
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